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Many who suffer from eating disorders claim that they see themselves as “fat”. Despite 
decades of research into the phenomenon, behavioural evidence has failed to confirm that 
eating disorders involve visual misperception of own-body size. I illustrate the importance of 
this phenomenon for our understanding of perceptual processing, outline the challenges 




A common complaint from those who suffer from eating disorders—both anorexia nervosa 
and bulimia nervosa—is that they see themselves as “fat”. This complaint has been a feature 
of clinical reports since the 70s (see: section 1), leading at least some contemporary 
researchers to assume that visual misperception of own-body size is a central feature of eating 
disorders. For example, Brooks and colleagues (2016, p. 1) write that people with eating 
disorders “often view themselves as much fatter than they really are”. Similarly, one 
clinicians’ handbook states, “In [anorexia nervosa], a sufferer does not see her skeletal body 
as it really is … she does not just think she is fat, but also sees … herself as fat” (Mondraty & 
Sachdev, 2011, p. 3257, their emphasis).  
 Despite some scientists assuming that people with eating disorders visually perceive 
themselves as larger, this claim has yet to be empirically confirmed.i While studies dating 
back to the 70s provide compelling evidence that people with eating disorders misestimate 
their own body size (see: section 3), the question of whether they also visually misperceive 
their own body size has yet to be answered. In this paper, I outline some of the problems that 
researchers face in using behavioural tasks to test for the presence of visual self-
misperception in participants with eating disorders, and I describe how experiments can be 
designed to overcome such issues.  
 In section 1, I introduce the hypothesis that people with eating disorders visually 
misperceive their own body size, distinguishing it from some similar hypotheses. In section 2, 
I outline some implications that the hypothesis holds for our understanding of perceptual 
processing. In section 3, I discuss prior attempts at experimentally confirming the hypothesis, 
involving tasks that require participants to visually estimate the size of their own bodies. I 
introduce three challenges that researchers face in using these tasks to confirm the presence 
of visual self-misperception. In section 4, I discuss some variations of body size estimate 
tasks and illustrate how they relate to the three challenges. Finally, in section 5, I discuss 
solutions to the challenges, in the way of experimental design principles. 
 
1. The Visual Self-Misperception Hypothesis 
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The idea that eating disorders involve visual self-misperception can be traced back to the 
well-known clinician Hilde Bruch (1974, p. 89), who claimed that anorexia nervosa involves 
a “disturbed size awareness”. Bruch based this claim on observations of her own clients and 
their complaints about perception of their own body size:  
 
…even after a good therapeutic relationship has developed, when they appear to be 
actively interested in understanding the background of their condition, they will 
complain, with a certain bewilderment, that they cannot “see” how thin they are (ibid., 
p. 89-90)ii 
 
Beyond Bruch’s work, complaints about misperception of one’s own body size have featured 
in several first-person reports (Espeset et al., 2011; 2012). I will refer to the claim that people 
with eating disorders visually misperceive their own body size as the visual self-
misperception hypothesis. Understanding this hypothesis, and how it can be experimentally 
confirmed, is the aim of this paper. First, I will discuss a few features of the hypothesis. 
The first thing to note is that visual misperception in eating disorders is assumed to be 
self-specific, only affecting perception of one’s own body size. People with eating disorders 
do not report misperception of other people’s bodies (Smeets, 1997, p. 78), indeed, they are 
often surprised at just how thin their peers appear (Espeset et al., 2011, p. 185). While some 
contemporary researchers have proposed that eating disorders involve domain general 
misperception of body size, I will not address this hypothesis here (Brooks et al., 2019). 
It is important to distinguish the visual self-misperception hypothesis from some 
related hypotheses with which it is sometimes conflated. The first pertains to cognitive 
differences associated with eating disorders. Consider the experience of seeing a banana: 
when looking at them, bananas appear to us as a certain size, shape, and colour. We can 
distinguish this perceptual experience from the cognitive states—thoughts, judgments, and 
beliefs—that we form about bananas, such as the judgment: “that looks delicious”, or the 
belief “there is a banana in front of me”. The visual self-misperception hypothesis is not 
about the kinds of cognitive states (thoughts, judgments, and beliefs) that people with eating 
disorders form when they look at themselves, it is about the way in which they perceive their 
bodies. 
Research shows that eating disorders are associated with negative judgments and 
beliefs about body size (Cash & Deagle, 1997). Researchers are attempting to understand 
why such judgments occur. They might occur due to visual misperception—wherein those 
with eating disorders see their bodies as larger—or they might occur despite accurate 
perception of body size. For example, people with eating disorders might simply apply 
particularly harsh standards, judging themselves as “fat”, “wide”, or “overweight” where 
others would not. The important question, then, is what these individuals see when they look 
in the mirror, not what they think, judge, or believe. 
The visual self-misperception hypothesis must also be distinguished from a hypothesis 
about attentional differences. Evidence suggests that, when looking in the mirror, people with 
eating disorders selectively attend to the (self-rated) “unattractive” parts of their own bodies 
(Tuschen-Caffier et al., 2015). While this difference in attention does change their perception 
of themselves—they perceive fatter as opposed to thinner parts, in virtue of attending to those 
parts—it is also not what is at stake. The visual self-misperception hypothesis claims that 
when people with eating disorders view themselves (for example, in a mirror), the body parts 
that they attend to are misperceived, appearing as larger.  
First-person reports support this strong interpretation, as many with eating disorders 
describe seeing their bodies as larger, in ways that cannot be reduced to judgments or 
thoughts about the body. For example, when asked what they see when they look at 
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themselves in the mirror, many draw a distinction between what they see and what they think, 
or believe: 
 
With my eyes I actually saw myself as big, but my intellect told me that it couldn’t be 
true (Espeset et al., 2011, p. 184) 
 
In the mirror I see that I’m fat, but I do actually understand that it can’t be true 
(Espeset et al., 2012, p. 523) 
 
Consistent with the visual self-misperception hypothesis, these reports distinguish perception 
of the body from judgments about the body.iii While such reports do suggest the presence of 
visual self-misperception in eating disorders, they are anecdotal. As such, they should be 
treated with caution. My goal in this paper is not to make strong empirical claims based off 
anecdotal reports, rather, it is to address the possibility of verifying such reports with 
experimental data. 
 
2. Theoretical Implications 
 
2.1. The Cognitive Penetrability of Vision 
 
Research into visual processing has been greatly advanced through studying cases in which it 
malfunctions. For example, cerebral achromatopsia (loss of colour perception) and motion 
blindness (loss of motion perception) were both instrumental in providing insights regarding 
the visual processing of colour and motion (McCloskey & Chaisilprungraung, 2017). The 
possibility that eating disorders involve visual misperception of body size would be equally 
instrumental in understanding how visual processing of body size functions. 
Note that the visual self-misperception hypothesis does not suggest that people with 
eating disorders exhibit a domain general form of misperception. Unlike cerebral 
achromatopsia and motion blindness, eating disorders are not suggested to involve an 
inability to perceive the relevant properties (body size). Rather, they are assumed to involve a 
qualitative difference in the way in which those properties are perceived, namely, as wider. 
Further still, this difference does not occur in all cases of body size perception, only in 
perception of one’s own body size. It thus qualifies as an incredibly unique form of 
misperception, which may uncover surprising insights regarding the functional characteristics 
of visual perception. Indeed, the visual self-misperception hypothesis has ramifications for 
perhaps the most controversial issue in vision research: the cognitive penetrability of vision 
(Firestone & Scholl, 2016; Stokes, 2013).  
Think back to the distinction between perception and cognition. It is uncontroversial 
to state that perception causally influences cognition; seeing a banana induces various 
cognitive states, for example, judgments about its taste (“how disgusting”) and beliefs about 
its presence (“there’s a banana in front of me”). What is controversial, however, is whether 
cognition can influence perception, for example, whether believing “there is a banana in front 
of me” could cause one to see a banana. This possibility is referred to as cognitive 
penetration, and it comes in many forms, each of which is the topic of their own debates. Two 
particularly controversial forms of cognitive penetration involve beliefs influencing 
perception (Stokes, 2014) and emotions influencing perception (Niedenthal & Wood, 2019). 
Some first-person reports suggest that these two factors may be involved with visual 
self-misperception in eating disorders. Specifically, they suggest that emotional states and the 
expectation of self-viewing can modulate whether misperception occurs: 
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Yesterday I was really sad and today I’m in a better mood. Today when I look in the 
mirror, I see myself differently, more positive. Yesterday I only saw a big hippo. 
Actually, I’ve never thought about it before, that I see my feelings in the mirror. I 
think that’s exactly how it is; when I have a bad day, I always see a big hippo. 
(Espeset et al., 2012, p. 524) 
 
I remember one occasion, I was passing an open door and saw myself in the mirror, 
but actually, I didn’t know that I saw myself. I just saw the image of a person in the 
mirror and thought; “Oh gosh, she is thin!” But then, when I understood that it was 
actually me, I didn’t see me as thin anymore. But then I actually saw a glimpse of it. 
(Espeset et al., 2011, p. 183) 
 
As before, we ought to exercise caution in how much evidential weight we give to these 
anecdotal reports. Nevertheless, they suggest that, in the case of eating disorders, vision 
might be modulated by non-perceptual states, such as emotions or the expectation of seeing 
oneself. This possibility warrants further investigation and discussion (Gadsby & Hohwy, 
2020). 
Even if we reject the possibility that visual self-misperception in eating disorders is 
caused by cognitive or emotional states—it might, for example, be underpinned by entirely 
perceptual mechanisms (Brooks et al., 2019)—it nevertheless represents a compelling form 
of aberrant visual processing, given its domain specific nature (i.e., being restricted to the 
dimensions of one’s own body). Such a phenomenon may provide insights into how human 
bodies are visually processed (Peelen & Downing, 2007). 
 
2.2. Tactile and Proprioceptive Body Representation 
 
In processing proprioceptive and tactile signals, our brains rely on perceptual representations 
of our own body size. In order to compute the distance between two points of tactile contact, 
the brain maps those points on to a representation of the skin’s surface (Longo et al., 2010). 
In order to compute motor commands and control movement, the brain relies on a 
representation of the relevant body parts (Gadsby & Williams, 2018). Mounting behavioural 
evidence suggests that, in the case of eating disorders, these body representations are 
distorted, representing the body as larger. In the case of touch, participants with eating 
disorders systematically judge tactile distances as larger than neurotypical controls (Keizer et 
al., 2011; Keizer et al., 2012), especially along salient body parts (e.g. the waist and 
abdomen) (Risso et al., 2020; Spitoni et al., 2015).iv Similarly, when passing through 
apertures (such as doorways), participants with eating disorders move their bodies as if they 
were larger (Beckmann et al., 2020; Engel & Keizer, 2017; Keizer et al., 2013; Metral et al., 
2014). This evidence is taken to suggest that people with eating disorders exhibit tactile and 
proprioceptive representations of body size that are distorted (Gadsby, 2017a). 
There is considerable debate over how perceptual body representations function (Gadsby, 
2019). As with the study of vision, this research is informed by disorders in which body 
representations malfunction (de Vignemont, 2010). To understand how representation of the 
body functions, we must understand how and why it malfunctions in cases of 
psychopathology, such as eating disorders. The visual self-misperception hypothesis provides 
an answer: if people with eating disorders visually misperceive themselves, then this 
misperception may provide the inaccurate content exhibited by their body representations. 
Given that representations of body size are highly dependent on visual information (De 
Vignemont, 2018), if such information was inaccurate, then this would explain why these 
body representations become distorted. Consequently, the visual self-misperception 
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hypothesis holds important implications for our understanding of tactile and proprioceptive 
processing. 
 
3. Visual Self-Misperception and Body Size Estimation 
 
Directly inspired by Bruch’s clinical observations, researchers began attempting to verify the 
visual self-misperception hypothesis by conducting experiments requiring participants to 
estimate their own body size (Slade, 1985). The first of these experiments, by Slade and 
Russell (1973), instructed participants to manipulate the distance between two lights 
(mounted onto a track) until it corresponded to the width of different body parts (chest, face, 
waist, and hips). While the control group estimated body size accurately, the eating disorder 
group overestimated the width (but not height) of several body parts. These participants did 
not, however, overestimate the size of inanimate objects (see also: Bowden et al., 1989; 
Brown et al., 2021; Garner et al., 1976), and only slightly overestimated other women’s body 
parts.  
Over the past four decades, researchers have developed and employed many 
variations of these body size estimate (BSE) tasks. The results of these experiments suggest 
that, on average, participants with eating disorders (both anorexia nervosa and bulimia 
nervosa) overestimate their bodies compared to neurotypical controls (for review and 
theoretical discussion, see: Farrell et al., 2005; Gardner & Brown, 2014; Mölbert et al., 2017; 
Smeets, 1997; Smeets et al., 1997).  
Early on, researchers interpreted these results as confirmation of the visual self-
misperception hypothesis, assuming that participants estimated themselves as larger because 
they saw themselves as larger (Garner & Garfinkel, 1982; Slade & Russell, 1973). This 
assumption requires some unpacking. Because early BSE tasks restricted participants from 
viewing their own bodies, it is not immediately clear how visual self-perception could be 
implicated (Smeets, 1999, p. 46). Such tasks were not assumed to directly measure 
participants’ perception of themselves. Rather, they were assumed to do so indirectly, via the 
medium of visual memory. Researchers assumed that in order to estimate one’s own body 
size, participants would rely on a memory of their own body, often referred to as “the body 
image” (Schilder, 1935). Consequently, BSE tasks were taken to be a measure of the body 
image’s dimensions—“if overestimation takes place, the body image has to be fatter” 
(Smeets, 1997, p. 88).  
However, even if overestimation stems from a distorted body image, this does not 
entail distorted visual perception of the body. For that conclusion, an additional assumption is 
required, namely, that the content of the body image is exclusively derived from visual 
perception. Smeets and Panhuysen (1995) describe this assumption like so: 
 
The body image was believed to be a snapshot of the body percept (the body as it is 
directly perceived), in which size and shape characteristics have been accurately 
preserved. Thus, overestimation of body size was interpreted as indicating how a 
patient perceives herself when looking in the mirror, the body image functioning as an 
intermediary station between this percept and the size estimate (p. 113, endnote 1) 
 
In this way, BSE tasks were assumed be a valid and reliable measure of visual self-
perception. 
Throughout the 80s and 90s, several researchers began to question whether these tasks 
could in fact provide evidence for the visual self-misperception hypothesis (for review, see: 
Smeets & Panhuysen, 1995; Smeets, 1999). Here, I will discuss two concerns that arose. The 
first concern regards the role of additional factors in influencing body size estimates. The 
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second concern regards the role of non-perceptual factors in influencing visual memory of the 
body. As I will demonstrate, these concerns are still relevant. 
Consider the first concern. While participants may rely on their visual memory to 
estimate body size, other factors could also influence such estimates. Thinking back to the 
distinction between perception and cognition, body size estimates may be influenced by 
various cognitive factors. For example, participants may provide estimates of the body that 
they believe, think, or feel themselves to have, rather than the body that they perceive 
(Smeets et al., 2009, p. 158). Demand characteristics might also play a role, wherein 
participants overestimate in an attempt to “help” or “sabotage” the experiment (ibid.). The 
issue, more generally put, is that that there exists a strong possibility that responses in BSE 
tasks are biased by factors that researchers do not intend to measure. I will refer to this as the 
response bias challenge. 
Consider the second concern. Even if body size estimates are directly reflective of 
visual memory—and those with eating disorders do remember themselves as larger than 
reality—we need not also assume that memory accurately reflects perception. Doing so 
would assume (as the above quote reflects) a notion of memory as operating much like a 
camera, storing faithful “snapshots” of experience for later recall. Researchers no longer hold 
such a view: memories are not so much recalled as reconstructed—a process which is itself 
prone to bias and error (Kourken & Sutton, 2017). Many eating disorder researchers came to 
believe that this process of reconstruction was a more likely culprit for body image distortion 
(Smeets et al., 2009). According to this view, while overestimation may stem from distorted 
memory, the distortion occurs during reconstruction. I will refer to this as the reconstruction 
challenge.v  
Note that there is a straightforward way to avoid the reconstruction challenge: by 
measuring direct perception (rather than memory) of the body. There are different ways to 
achieve this, for example, by requiring participants to view themselves in a mirror (Shafran & 
Fairburn, 2002), or by allowing participants to use a photograph of themselves as a reference 
point (Smeets et al., 1999). If participants follow instructions appropriately, such tasks will 
constitute a measure of direct visual perception and thus avoid the reconstruction problem. 
Consequently, much of this essay will be focused on how to avoid the response bias 
challenge, as well a new challenge, which I introduce in the next section. 
 
3.1. The El Greco Challenge 
 
El Greco was a Spanish renaissance artist who painted subjects with elongated forms. Some 
art historians suggested that this painting style was due to El Greco suffering from 
astigmatism, an ocular defect which causes a stretched-out perception of the world (Firestone, 
2013). As Firestone & Scholl illustrate, such an interpretation is fallacious: 
 
If El Greco truly experienced a stretched-out world, then he would also have 
experienced a stretched-out canvas. In that case, the distortions should have canceled 
each other out: Just as El Greco would have seen real-word figures as elongated, so 
too would he have seen his paintings as elongated, and so the real-world distortions he 
experienced would never have transferred to his reproductions. (2014, p. 39) 
 
This problem can be reduced to a simple principle, “When a constant-error distortion should 
affect equally the means of reproduction and the item reproduced, the effects should cancel 
each other out” (ibid., p. 45). This can be characterised in terms of the difference between 
one’s perception of a stimulus and one’s perception of the means of reproducing that 
stimulus, which I will label the input and output. If El Greco suffered from astigmatism, then 
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both his perception of the world (the input) and his perception of the lines on his canvas 
(output) would be susceptible to the same distortion. Because of this match in distortion, the 
strokes of his paintbrush would remain faithful to the lines of the reproduced objects, and no 
distortion would be reproduced. If El Greco’s perception was distorted, his painting would 
not reflect it. This presents a challenge for researching visual self-misperception: contexts 
where the relevant misperception is predicted to affect both input and output can undo 
evidence of misperception. I will refer to this as the el Greco challenge.  
Note something about the el Greco challenge: it is not important what kinds of actions are 
used to reproduce the input. El Greco could be painting, drawing, manipulating a photograph, 
or answering a set of questions to reproduce a stimulus. So long as the same distortion affects 
both input and output, cancellation should occur. Consequently, the relevance of the El Greco 
challenge to BSE tasks is not determined by the kinds of actions participants take to indicate 
their body size. What does matter, however, is the appearance of the output. El Greco’s 
assumed deficit (astigmatism) is domain general, causing him to perceive everything as 
elongated. Because of this, he would misperceive both the world and the canvas, leading to a 
cancellation effect. This is importantly different to the visual self-misperception hypothesis, 
wherein the relevant distortion only affects visual perception of one’s own body size (along 
certain dimensions). This places an important constraint on how the El Greco challenge 
applies to BSE results. For cancellation to occur, the same distortion must apply equally to 
the input (the visually perceived body) and the output (the stimulus used to estimate the 
body). As I will illustrate, there is reason to expect cancellation to occur in many forms of 
BSE task. 
 
4. Body Size Estimate Task Variations  
 
4.1 Stimuli Realism 
 
An important feature of BSE tasks is the kinds of stimuli used to estimate. For our purposes, 
the most relevant feature is their realism. In many BSE tasks, participants indicate their body 
size using stimuli that do not realistically depict themselves, such as silhouettes of bodies, 
computer generated models, or abstract distances indicated with lines, callipers, or points on a 
wall (for example, see figure 1). However, some BSE tasks employ photographs or videos of 
participants’ own bodies, digitally manipulated to be different sizes (for example, see figure 
2). Participants estimate their body size by manipulating the stimulus themselves (Collins, 












Figure 1. The contour drawing rating scale (Thompson & Gray, 1995). Experiments that employ this 














Figure 2. Realistic stimuli from a BSE task, created by manipulating a photograph of the participants’ 
body (Brooks et al., 2016). Though removed here (for anonymity), the participant’s own face is 
visible in the experiment. 
 
The distinction between realistic and non-realistic stimuli is crucially relevant to the el Greco 
challenge. In the case of BSE tasks, the input is always perception of one’s own body, 
whether directly or via the medium of visual memory. When the estimating stimulus is 
sufficiently realistic to induce misperception, the el Greco challenge predicts a cancellation 
effect. This poses a problem for the use of realistic BSE tasks to test the visual self-
misperception hypothesis. Consider two possible findings of a task that uses realistic stimuli.  
 
Outcome 1: The eating disorder group overestimate their body size compared to the 
control group. 
 
This outcome fails to confirm the visual self-misperception hypothesis. If participants truly 
misperceived themselves, then such misperception should cancel out, as both input and 
output would exhibit this distortion. Any misestimation, then, must stem from other factors 
(for example, response bias). Such an outcome also fails to disconfirm the visual self-
misperception hypothesis, as participants may misperceive themselves and the stimulus 
(leading to cancellation) but also overestimate their bodies due to other factors. 
 
 Outcome 2: No between-group differences in size estimation 
 
This outcome also neither confirms nor disconfirms the visual self-misperception hypothesis. 
No between-group differences may be due to a cancellation effect occurring in the eating 
disorder group (consistent with the hypothesis) or because both groups accurately perceive 
themselves (contrary to the hypothesis).  
The lesson for designing BSE tasks to measure visual self-misperception is that they 
must involve a mismatch between input and output. Otherwise, a cancellation effect will 
occur, and the results cannot be used to uncover misperception. 
Note an issue regarding the el Greco challenge and stimuli realism. Given the lack of 
precisely specified theory regarding the cause of self-misperception in eating disorders, it is 
unclear when misperception should occur. For example, while people with eating disorders 
report seeing themselves as larger while viewing themselves in the mirror, it is an open 
question whether misperception extends to other visual representations, such as photographs. 
Without understanding more about how self-misperception in eating disorders functions, we 
cannot predict the kinds of stimuli that will induce it. Nevertheless, the possibility that stimuli 
are sufficiently realistic to induce misperception undermines the reliability of tasks that use 
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such stimuli. The el Greco challenge can be avoided by ensuring that BSE tasks employ 
stimuli that are maximally non-realistic, for example, metric stimuli such as rectangles. 
 
4.2. Forced Choice Tasks 
 
Another important feature of BSE tasks is the procedure itself. In many BSE tasks, 
participants estimate their body size in a single trial. The estimate is compared against the 
participant’s true body size, to calculate a measure of misestimation. In contrast, some BSE 
tasks show participants different sized stimuli over numerous trials and force them to make a 
choice between one of two responses: in most cases, whether the image is larger or smaller 
than their own body. While the last section argued that BSE tasks that employ realistic bodily 
stimuli are susceptible to the el Greco challenge, this section argues that—contrary to the 
claims of many researchers—these forced choice tasks are susceptible to the response bias 
challenge. 
Forced choice BSE tasks were pioneered by Rick Gardner and colleagues in the 80s 
and 90s (Gardner & Bokenkamp, 1996; Gardner & Moncrieff, 1988). These researchers 
sought to use principles from psychophysics to design tasks that could avoid the response 
bias challenge and determine whether overestimation of body size in eating disorders is due 
to misperception. As Gardner & Moncrief (p. 106) put it, “Only by using a psychophysical 
methodology… can one investigate the separate roles of sensory and nonsensory factors”. 
Forced choice tasks based on these principles are still used today, and contemporary 
researchers maintain the ability of these tasks to resolve issues related to response bias 
(Cornelissen et al., 2013).  
Claims of distinguishing between sensory and non-sensory contributions to body size 
estimation are based on a distinction between two variables provided by such tasks: the point 
of subjective equality (PSE) and the just noticeable difference (JND). The PSE is derived by 
calculating the mean size of the stimuli in trials where the participant provides each response 
equally. As with measures of overestimation in standard BSE tasks, this variable is taken to 
be the “body size that an observer judges to be subjectively equal to their actual size” 
(Gardner, 2012, p. 526). In contrast, the JND is calculated as the difference between trials 
where responses are 25% & 75%, respectively, in other words, “the amount of change in 
body size necessary in order for an observer to detect that change one-half of the time” (ibid.) 
(see figure 3). The JND is interpreted as a measure of perceptual sensitivity: the ability to 
(visually) discriminate between two stimuli.  
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Figure 3. A plot illustrating the relationship between participant responses, PSE, and JND 
(Cornelissen et al., 2015, p. 82; reprinted with permission from Elsevier). Two hypothetical PSE 
values are represented, y and y’: y represents a low body size estimate, y’ represents a high body size 
estimate. The difference between x & z and x’ & z’ correspond to two JND values, respectively. The 
former (x-z) represents high perceptual sensitivity, while the latter (x’- z’) represents low perceptual 
sensitivity.  
 
According to researchers who employ these methods, the PSE reflects a form of response 
bias—i.e. “nonsensory, or affective, components of body image judgments” (Gardner & 
Boice, 2004, p. 94), while the JND is a measure of the “participant’s sensitivity in detecting 
changes in body size and is a relatively unbiased indicator of sensory factors” (ibid., p. 93-
94). Results of these forced choice studies indicate that participants with eating disorders 
exhibit differences in PSE (overestimation) but no differences in JND (for review, see: 
Garner, 2012).  
Given their interpretation of the PSE and JND, many researchers consider these 
findings to have resolved the response bias challenge entirely. As Gardner (2012, p. 529) 
writes, “[results from these studies] conclusively demonstrated that it is cognitive factors and 
not any sensory factor that is responsible for anorexic individuals reporting they ‘see’ a fat 
image when they look in a mirror”. This opinion is echoed in numerous papers employing 
these techniques, for example, in discussing the results of their forced choice task, 
Cornelissen and colleagues (2013, p. 110) write “[body size over-estimation] is primarily 
based on attitudinal factors (as indexed by PSE) rather than perception (as indexed by DL).” 
It is straight forward to see that, independently, such tasks cannot be used to confirm 
or disconfirm the visual self-misperception hypothesis. First, note that, for this hypothesis, it 
is not relevant whether participants with eating disorders exhibit differences in perceptual 
sensitivity to changes in body size. The hypothesis pertains to differences in the dimensions 
that people with eating disorders perceive, when self-viewing, not their perceptual sensitivity. 
There is no obvious reason why misperception of bodily dimensions should necessarily be 
associated with a difference in body size sensitivity. 
The second thing to note is that the PSE is not exclusively a measure of response bias. 
While it is likely that the PSE is susceptible to different forms of response bias, it is also 
determined by perceptual factors: most obviously, by the way in which the original stimulus 
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is perceived. Consider a scenario where two participants, alike in all other ways, are shown 
the same stimulus, but one suffers from a visual defect causing them to perceive it as larger. 
When estimating the size of the stimulus in a forced choice task, the participant with the 
distorted perception would exhibit a larger PSE, as the perceptual reference point (the 
stimulus) is perceived as larger. Consequently, between-group differences in PSE can neither 
confirm nor disconfirm the visual self-misperception hypothesis, as any differences might be 
genuinely perceptual, or stem from response bias.  
There are many useful features of forced choice BSE tasks, and these tasks have been put 
to good use in advancing several interesting hypotheses regarding the cause of body size 
overestimation in eating disorders (Cornelissen et al., 2013; 2015). While such tasks cannot 
currently answer the response bias challenge, future variations might. The literature on 
psychophysics features several methodological proposals for addressing similar problems, 
which may provide inspiration for future tasks (Jogan & Stocker, 2014; Morgan, 2014; 
Morgan et al., 2013).    
 
5. Overcoming The Challenges 
 
In the previous section, I outlined several challenges for the use of BSE tasks to test the 
visual self-misperception hypothesis. In this section, I describe how these tasks can be 
designed to overcome these challenges.  
Designs that rely on participants’ memory of their own bodies are subject to the 
reconstruction challenge: different factors influence the reconstruction of memories, therefore 
misremembering one’s body size is not evidence of misperceiving it. As noted, researchers 
can avoid this challenge by requiring participants to directly estimate their own body size (as 
many do). 
 For BSE tasks where both the input and output (the stimulus being estimated and the 
stimulus being used to estimate) are realistic depictions of the body, the el Greco challenge 
predicts a cancellation effect, and the results cannot be used to inform the visual self-
misperception hypothesis. This challenge can be avoided by creating a mismatch between 
input and output, such that the stimuli used to estimate are (entirely) non-realistic, for 
example, abstract lines or shapes.  
 While many variations of BSE tasks already avoid the reconstruction and el Greco 
challenges, the response bias challenge affects any task where participants are explicitly 
instructed to estimate their own body size. There are two main ways in which response bias 
undermines BSE results. The first is that participants’ beliefs, thoughts, and emotions about 
their body size influence their response, for example, when they estimate the body size that 
they believe themselves to have. The second is that participants’ assumptions about what the 
experimenter expects influence their response, for example, when they attempt to help the 
experimenter by providing the expected response. To avoid the first possibility, tasks must be 
designed to disrupt the predicted effect between body attitudes and body estimation. To avoid 
the second possibility, tasks must be designed to obscure the experimenter’s expected 
response. 
In what follows, I discuss one strategy for disrupting the link between attitudes and 
responses and obscure the expected response of the experimenter (for similar suggestions, 
see: Gross et al., 2014; Valenti & Firestone, 2019). To provide an illustration of this strategy, 
I introduce the transposed BSE task. This task involves switching the input and output of a 
task in an unexpected way, requiring participants to estimate the size of a metric object by 
manipulating a realistic depiction of themselves (for example, a realistically sized 




Figure 4. Example stimuli: perception of the rectangle is the input and perception of the photograph is 
the output. In the experiment, the participants own face would be shown. Potential task instructions: 
“manipulate the size of your body until the width of your abdomen matches the width of the 
rectangle”. Photograph taken from Brooks et al. (2016). 
 
First, note this task would avoid both the reconstruction and el Greco challenges. The 
experiment is designed to measure how participants (directly) perceive the stimulus used to 
estimate the rectangle (the photograph of themselves), therefore visual memory is not 
involved. Furthermore, there is a mismatch between input (rectangle) and output 
(photograph), so no cancellation effect is predicted.vii  
What is notable about a design like this, however, is that it lessens the potential for 
response bias by both obscuring the experimenter’s expected response and disrupting the 
predicted link between bodily attitudes and size estimation. It does so by predicting an 
unintuitive result: that participants with eating disorders will underestimate the size of the 
rectangle. To see how this works, consider two possible outcomes of this task:  
 
Outcome 1: No between-group differences in size estimation 
 
This outcome suggests that, just like the control group, people with eating disorders 
accurately perceive both stimuli and accurately estimate the size of the rectangle, without 
response bias. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that there are no perceptual 
differences between these groups, disconfirming the visual self-misperception hypothesis. 
 
Outcome 2: The eating disorder group underestimate the rectangle’s size, compared to 
the control group. 
 
This outcome provides evidence in favour of the visual self-misperception hypothesis. To see 
why, imagine that both stimuli (rectangle and body) are 20cm wide. If participants accurately 
perceived the rectangle but misperceived their own body—say, as 25 cm wide, rather than 
20—then, in attempting to match the perceived size of the body to the perceived size of the 
box, the participant would need to manipulate the body to be (objectively) smaller. 
Note how this outcome helps to dampen the response bias challenge. Given that the 
task does not require participants to estimate their own body size, participants will not 
overestimate due to selecting a size corresponding to how they believe, think, or feel about 
their bodies.viii Similarly, it is unlikely that demand characteristics would cause such an 
outcome: it would require extremely careful reasoning on behalf of the participant to 
conclude that the experimenter desired them to underestimate the size of the rectangle. 
Because this desired outcome is much less obvious, the experiment is less susceptible to 
demand characteristics.ix  
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The transposed BSE task is presented here as proof of a general principle: by 
disrupting the link between bodily attitudes and body size estimation, and obscuring the 
expected response of the experimenter, BSE tasks can be made less susceptible to the 
response bias challenge. Consequently, they may still prove useful for testing the visual self-




I discussed the hypothesis that people with eating disorders visually misperceive their own 
body size. While first-person reports suggest that visual self-misperception occurs, BSE 
results have has yet to confirm or disconfirm these reports. My aim is not to undermine the 
general validity or usefulness of these tasks.x Rather, my aim is to assess the possibility that 
they can generate data to either confirm or disconfirm the visual self-misperception 
hypothesis.  
I identified three methodological challenges which stand in the way of testing the 
visual self-misperception hypothesis. Two of these challenges—reconstruction and el 
Greco—can be overcome by requiring participants to directly estimate their body size and 
ensuring that there is a mismatch between input (the stimulus being estimated) and output 
(the stimulus used to make the estimate). The issue of response bias is more difficult to 
overcome and applies to any form of BSE task where participants are explicitly instructed to 
judge their own body size. To address this issue, I suggested that BSE tasks be designed to 
obscure the experimenter’s expected response and disrupt the link between bodily attitudes 
and size estimation. I discussed one way of achieving this: the transposed BSE task, wherein 
the input and output are switched, and participants are required to estimate the size of an 
object by manipulating a photograph of themselves. By using a method such as this, there is 
hope for confirming whether body size overestimation in eating disorders is due to 
misperception or response bias. 
The outcome of this research program has crucial ramifications for our understanding 
of perceptual processing. If visual self-misperception occurs in eating disorders, then the 
phenomenon can be used to inform models of tactile and proprioceptive body representation 




Thanks to members of the Cognition and Philosophy Lab and the Dijkerman Lab for helpful 
discussion. Thanks to Manja Engel, Jakob Hohwy, Dan Williams, Jennifer Windt, and four 
anonymous reviewers for written feedback. This research was supported by an Australian 




i While once widely held, the assumption that people with eating disorders visually 
misperceive themselves fell out of favour during the 90s (for a historical overview, see: 
Smeets, 1997). It is difficult to estimate how common the assumption is amongst 
contemporary eating disorder researchers. However, there are undoubtedly several research 
groups who hold it, for example, those attempting to illustrate that visual misperception in 
eating disorders is a result of perceptual adaptation (for a review, see: Brooks et al., 2019). In 
this paper, I argue that it is an important hypothesis not because it is widely held, but because 
it is strongly suggested by first-person reports (section 1) and bears important theoretical 
implications (section 2).    
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ii This excerpt is followed by an anecdote: 
 
A woman of 20, who seemed to be making good progress, admitted “I really cannot 
see how thin I am. I look into the mirror and I cannot see it; I know I am thin because 
when I feel myself I notice that there is nothing but bones” 
iii One might argue that these reports do not distinguish differences in visual perception from 
differences in attention. However, it seems unlikely that one would report seeing themselves 
as larger when in fact they were simply attending to those parts of their bodies that they 
judged to be larger.  
iv For some recent contradictory findings, see (Engel et al., 2021) 
v This challenge can be formulated more generally: for any BSE task that requires 
participants to estimate their body size without seeing themselves, participants must rely on 
an alternative representation of body size. The reconstruction challenge, more generally put, 
involves the possibility that this representation is distorted by factors distinct from visual 
perception. 
vi The distinction between non-realistic and realistic stimuli is importantly different from the 
more commonly discussed distinction between metric and depictive stimuli (Mölbert et al., 
2017). Metric stimuli are metric standards (e.g. lines or calliper distances), while depictive 
stimuli depict a human body (Longo & Haggard, 2012). While metric stimuli all qualify as 
non-realistic, some depictive stimuli do also. For example, silhouettes or drawings of bodies 
are both depictive and non-realistic. The category of realistic stimuli I introduce here refers to 
a subset of depictive stimuli: those that depict realistically (such as photographs and videos). 
vii To induce misperception, the photograph of the participant’s body must be maximally 
realistic, for example, by appearing like a mirror reflection (Shafran & Fairburn, 2002) 
viii While the suggested task design does avoid the most discussed form of response bias 
(participants selecting body sizes that reflect their beliefs, thoughts, and emotions), it does not 
entirely avoid response bias. For example, unpleasantness associated with seeing their own 
bodies enlarged may bias participants towards manipulating the photograph to be narrower. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
ix This leaves a third potential outcome: the eating disorder group overestimate the rectangle’s 
size, compared to the control group. While it is not clear why this outcome would occur, it is 
consistent with influence from demand characteristics, wherein participants incorrectly guess 
the experimenter’s expectation (that appearance of one’s own body causes one to 
overestimate). 
x In fact, I have argued elsewhere that the process of self-comparison that occurs in these 
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